We model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers endogenously engage in both brand advertising (to create loyal customers) and price advertising (to attract "shoppers"). Our analysis allows for "cross-channel" e¤ects between brand and price advertising. In contrast to models where loyalty is exogenous, these cross-channel e¤ects lead to a continuum of symmetric equilibria; however, the set of equilibria converges to a unique equilibrium as the number of potential e-retailers grows arbitrarily large. Price dispersion is a key feature of all of these equilibria, including the limit equilibrium. While each …rm …nds it optimal to advertise its brand in an attempt to "grow" its base of loyal customers, in equilibrium, branding (1) reduces …rm pro…ts, (2) increases prices paid by loyals and shoppers, and (3) adversely a¤ects gatekeepers operating price comparison sites. Branding also tightens the range of prices and reduces the value of the price information provided by a comparison site. Using data from a price comparison site, we test several predictions of the model. JEL Nos: D4, D8, M3, L13. Keywords: Price dispersion
brand-building might matter a great deal. If brand advertising ultimately converted all consumers into "loyals," …rms would …nd it optimal to charge the "monopoly" price and price dispersion would vanish. Expressed di¤erently, it is not at all clear that dispersed price equilibria of the sort characterized in the extant literature (see footnote 4) survive when customer loyalty is endogenously determined by …rms'branding activities.
In Section 2, we o¤er a model with endogenous branding and pricing that captures salient features of competition among retailers at a price comparison site. In the model, a …xed number of …rms sell similar products. In the …rst stage, each …rm invests in brand advertising in an attempt to convert some or all consumers into "loyals."These branding decisions result in an endogenous partition of consumers into "loyals", who are loyal to a speci…c …rm, and "shoppers", who view the products to be identical. In the second stage, …rms independently make pricing decisions as well as decisions about informational advertising. Thus, the model entails endogenous branding, pricing, and informational advertising strategies.
We characterize all symmetric Nash equilibria and show that, in contrast to models where the number of loyal consumers is exogenous, endogenous branding leads to multiple equilibria. Importantly however, behavior converges to a unique symmetric equilibrium as the number of …rms grows arbitrarily large. In all equilibria-including the limit equilibriumbranding e¤orts by …rms create a signi…cant number of loyal consumers, but do not convert all shoppers into loyals. As a consequence, endogenous branding does not eliminate equilibrium price dispersion in online markets, although increased branding is associated with lower levels of price dispersion. Branding not only increases the average prices paid by loyal customers, but also raises the prices paid by shoppers who purchase at price comparison sites. Branding also negatively impacts "gatekeepers" operating price comparison sites in two ways. First, …rms'branding e¤orts increase the number of loyal consumers and thereby reduce tra¢ c at the price comparison site. (Interestingly, the gatekeeper cannot stem these losses by reducing its fees.) Second, branding tightens the distribution of prices and, as a consequence, reduces the value of price information provided by the site.
We also show that, even in the limit equilibrium where the number of potential competitors is "large" (as is the case in global online markets), prices remain dispersed above marginal cost. This …nding is in contrast to the models of Varian (1980) , Rosenthal (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) , which all predict that price dispersion vanishes as the number of potential competitors grows large. Our …ndings for large online markets are broadly consistent with daily data we have been collecting for several years and post weekly at our website, Nash-Equilibrium.com. Price dispersion, as measured by the range in prices, has remained quite stable over the past four years, at 35 to 40 percent. The stability and magnitude of this dispersion is remarkable from a theoretical perspective, since (1) the products are relatively expensive consumer electronics products for which the average price is about $500, (2) over the period the Internet rapidly eliminated geographic boundaries, leading to exponential growth in the number of consumers and businesses with direct Internet access, and (3) according to the Census Bureau, there were nearly 10,000 consumer electronics retail establishments in the United States who compete in the consumer electronics market. 5 Our model provides the …rst equilibrium rationale for how so many …rms could compete in such a price sensitive arena and yet have prices remain dispersed above marginal cost.
Finally, we use data from Shopper.com to test some of the predictions of the model. We …nd that more intense branding by …rms is associated with lower levels of price dispersion and higher prices to loyals and shoppers. These results are robust to a variety of controls.
Model
Consider an online market where a unit measure of consumers shop for a speci…c product (e.g., HP LaserJet 1100xi). There are N 2 sellers in this market, each having a constant marginal cost of m: 6 Each consumer is interested in purchasing at most one unit of the product, from which she derives value v. 7 As in Narasimhan and Rosenthal, there are assumed to be two types of consumers: loyals and shoppers. Shoppers costlessly visit the price comparison site to obtain a list of the prices charged by all …rms choosing to list their 5 This …gure is based on NAICS classi…cation code 443112, which is comprised of establishments known as consumer electronics stores primarily engaged in retailing new consumer-type electronic products. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census, January 5, 2001, p. 217. 6 The model readily extends to the case where there are positive …xed costs as well. 7 It is straightforward to generalize the model to allow for downward sloping demand.
prices there. 8 Since shoppers view sellers as perfect substitutes, they each purchase at the lowest price available at the price comparison site-provided it does not exceed v. If no prices are listed, these shoppers visit the website of a randomly selected …rm and purchase if the price does not exceed v. This parameterization accommodates anecdotal evidence that in some online markets it is easier for loyals to purchase from their preferred …rm through the price comparison site.
Among other things, search capabilities and product reviews are often superior at comparison sites than at individual …rm websites. In addition, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000a) provide evidence that some loyal consumers visit sellers'websites directly, while other loyal consumers purchase through links at price comparison sites. Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2005) observe similar patterns, and estimate that nearly 90 percent of consumers at the leading price comparison site in the UK are, in fact, loyal. Note, however, that since loyals always buy from their preferred seller, equilibrium prices and pro…ts turn out to be independent of
:
In contrast to the models of Narasimhan and Rosenthal, a consumer's type is determined endogenously by brand advertising on the part of …rms, as we will describe below. In contrast to Baye and Morgan (2001) , who assume that all consumers view …rms as identical, here we allow for the possibility that some consumers have a preference for particular sellers. There is considerable evidence that this is indeed the case. For instance, many consumers prefer to purchase books from Amazon rather than Barnes and Noble-even at higher prices. 10 To capture these e¤ects, let i denote the proportion of consumers who are loyal to …rm i.
Thus, the total measure of consumers loyal to some …rm is B = P N i=1 i . The remaining 8 Baye and Morgan (2001) show that a monopoly "gatekeeper" that owns a price comparison site has an incentive to set consumer subscription fees su¢ ciently low in an attempt to induce all consumers to utilize the site. Hence, we assume that all shoppers have access to the comparison site at no cost. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence; virtually all price comparison sites-including Shopper.com, Nextag, Expedia, and Travelocity-permit consumers to use their services at no charge. See also Jullien (2002, 2003) for analysis of competition among gatekeepers. 9 The analysis that follows implies the existence of a search cost, < v , such that this behavior comprises an optimal sequential search strategy. 10 For instance, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) provide evidence that the demand for books at Barnes and Noble is about 8 times more elastic than that at Amazon.
1 B shoppers view the sellers as identical.
There are three components to a …rm's strategy: Firm i must decide its price (denoted p i ), its informational advertising strategy, which is modeled as a binary decision to spend > 0 to list its price on the price comparison site (or not), and its brand advertising level, a i : Firms in ‡uence consumers'loyalty through brand advertising. We assume that branding leads to the acquisition of loyal customers according to the functional form:
where A i = P j6 =i a j denotes aggregate branding e¤ort by all …rms other than i, and where > 0 and 1 > > 0 are parameters. When A i > 0; positive branding e¤ort is required for …rm i to enjoy any loyal consumers. The " " term in equation (1) captures potential "brand stealing"e¤ects of brand advertising-brand advertising that steals loyal customers from other sellers. The " " term captures "brand expansion" e¤ects-brand advertising that converts some shoppers into loyals. The form of equation (1) is standard in the contest literature; see Nitzan (1994) for a survey.
Firms'incentives to engage in branding activities depend not only on the sensitivity of i to branding e¤orts (that is, the magnitude of ; ; and the aggregate branding e¤orts of rival …rms), but also on brand advertising costs. We assume that the marginal cost of a unit of brand advertising is > 0; so that the total cost to …rm i of a i units of brand advertising is a i : Finally, we assume that a i 2 0; 1 N , which merely guarantees that aggregate branding e¤orts do not lead to more loyals than is feasible given the unit mass of consumers and the speci…cation in equation (1) :
In many online markets, …rms adjust prices frequently and quickly, and there is considerable turnover in the identity of the …rm o¤ering the lowest price; for evidence, see Ellison and Ellison (2005) as well as . In contrast, branding decisions typically require substantial up-front investments, which take time to mature into a sizeable base of loyal customers. Hence, we model branding and pricing decisions as a two-stage game. In the …rst stage, …rms simultaneously choose brand advertising levels, a i ; in an attempt to create a stock of loyal consumers. In the second stage, after having observed …rst stage decisions, …rms simultaneously make pricing and listing decisions.
Equilibrium Branding, Pricing, and Listing Decisions
The structure of our model attempts to capture the "strategic uncertainty"present in …rms' branding and pricing decisions. In particular, the value to a …rm committing up-front resources on branding activity critically depends on its view of the competitiveness of the market for shoppers in the second-stage game. As we show in Proposition 1, the strategic uncertainty present in this setting leads to a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria. However, as Proposition 3 shows, the multiplicity issue turns out to be moot in markets where the number of competing …rms is su¢ ciently large. Speci…cally, we show that (1) there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which players employ secure branding strategies, 11 and (2) all symmetric equilibria converge to the unique equilibrium in secure branding strategies as the number of competing …rms grow arbitrarily large. As will be apparent in our characterization equilibria, it is useful to de…ne
We focus on equilibria in which …rms employ both informational and brand advertising.
Obviously, this requires that the informational advertising channel be su¢ ciently attractive that …rms …nd it in their interest to periodically advertise prices at the clearinghouse, and that brand advertising be su¢ ciently expensive that …rms do not …nd it in their interest to use this channel exclusively. For this reason, we shall assume:
Among other things, this condition rules out equilibria that are degenerate in the sense that …rms eschew the informational advertising channel and simply price at v: It is straightforward to show that the set of parameter values satisfying Condition 1 is non-empty-even in the limit as N goes to in…nity. 11 Recall that secure branding strategies maximize the mininum possible payo¤ that can be imposed on a player during the second-stage pricing game.
We now provide a complete characterization of the set of symmetric equilibria arising when Condition 1 holds. In the sequel, let i denote the probability a …rm lists its price, and use F i (p) to represent the distribution of …rm i's listed price.
Proposition 1 There exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria when brand and informational advertising is endogenous. In any symmetric equilibrium:
Each …rm chooses branding level a 2 [a L ; a H ], which generates
loyal consumers per …rm. The total measure of loyal customers in the market is B N 2 (0; 1) : Each …rm lists its price on the price comparison site with probability
and, conditional on listing, selects a price from the cumulative distribution function
over the support [p 0 ; v] where
Firms that do not list a price at the price comparison site charge a price of p i = v on their own websites. Each …rm earns equilibrium pro…ts of
Proposition 1, which is proved in Appendix A, shows that multiple equilibria arise in the presence of endogenous branding. Nonetheless, all of the equilibria have the property that branding e¤orts by …rms convert some but not all consumers into loyals; in equilibrium, there remain 1 B > 0 shoppers who purchase from the …rm charging the lowest price listed at the comparison site. This prediction appears consistent with empirical …ndings that some, but not all, online consumers buy at the lowest listed price. Note, however, that equilibrium advertising and pricing strategies, as well as …rms'pro…ts, are independent of the parameter describing the search behavior of loyals.
The equilibria identi…ed above share features present in the models of Varian, Rosenthal, Narasimhan, and Baye-Morgan-as well as some important di¤erences. Similar to all of these models, equilibria in the present model require any …rm listing a price on the price comparison site to use a pricing strategy that prevents rivals from being able to systematically predict the price o¤ered to consumers who enjoy the information posted at the site (hence the distributional strategy, F (p)). Like Baye-Morgan, our model permits …rms to endogenously determine whether to utilize the price comparison site (the other models constrain all …rms to list prices at the site with probability one, and Baye-Morgan essentially show this is not an equilibrium when it is costly for …rms to list prices at the site). As a consequence, in any equilibrium …rms must randomize the timing of price listings to preclude rivals from systematically determining the number of listings at the price comparison site (hence, the informational advertising propensity, 2 (0; 1)).
In contrast to Narasimhan and Rosenthal, the present model relaxes the assumption that …rms are costlessly endowed with an exogenous number of brand-loyal consumers. In the present model, a …rm that spends nothing to promote its "brand"or "service"in the face of positive expenditures by rivals enjoys no loyal consumers. In contrast to Varian and Baye-
Morgan, the present model does not impose the assumption that all consumers view the products sold by di¤erent …rms to be identical; indeed, in equilibrium, each …rm enjoys a strictly positive measure of loyal consumers-thanks to the positive level of branding activity that arises in equilibrium. As we will discuss below, this implies that the price comparison site attracts fewer consumers than in the Baye-Morgan model. Expressed di¤erently, the branding e¤orts of …rms reduce the tra¢ c enjoyed by the "information gatekeeper"operating the price comparison site.
Another di¤erence between these models and the present model is that, in the former, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium while, in the latter, endogenous branding leads to a continuum of symmetric equilibria. The presence of a continuum of equilibria gives rise to a coordination problem: how do …rms determine which "branding equilibrium" to play? The set of symmetric equilibria can be payo¤-ordered from highest (a = a L ) to lowest (a = a H ) ;
and the equilibria di¤er in terms of the payo¤ risk to which …rms are exposed. In this respect, these equilibria resemble those of the coordination games studied both theoretically and experimentally by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990). They …nd experimental evidence that subjects tend to adopt secure strategies when faced with coordination games of this type; thus, it seems natural to compare the symmetric equilibria identi…ed in Proposition 1 in terms of their security properties.
Notice that, when rivals choose branding levels a j = a in the …rst stage, the lowest payo¤ that can be imposed on …rm i is
That is, …rm i can do no worse than to eschew informational advertising ( i = 0) and charge the monopoly price to its loyal customers (p i = v) regardless of its perceptions about the competitiveness of the market for shoppers. Substituting for (a i ; A i ) yields
The brand advertising level that maximizes i's secure payo¤ satis…es the …rst-order condition
It is routine to show that these …rst-order conditions imply:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in secure branding strategies, denoted a 2 (a L ; a H ). Speci…cally, (1) …rms choose brand advertising levels
loyal consumers per …rm; and (2) …rms follow the second stage pricing and informational advertising strategies described in Proposition 1.
For future reference, we let B = N and use ; F ; p 0 and E to denote the relevant second-stage components of the equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 2. Together, these components comprise what we shall hereafter refer to as an a equilibrium.
Asymptotics
We now examine characteristics of online markets where an arbitrarily large number of …rms compete. We …rst show, in Proposition 3, that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium level of brand advertising converging to the a equilibrium as N ! 1: That is, the coordination problem is less severe in "large"online markets: all symmetric equilibria are arbitrarily close to the equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 2. This proposition is proved in Appendix A as well.
Proposition 3
In any symmetric equilibrium, …rst-stage branding levels converge to a as the number of competing …rms (N ) grows arbitrarily large. Formally, let ha N ; N ; F N i be an arbitrary sequence of symmetric equilibria. Then
Next, we show that the unique limit equilibrium is nontrivial in the sense that it displays both price dispersion and …nite numbers of …rms (in expectation) using the informational advertising channel. First, note that the number of potential competitors, N , generally exceeds the actual number of …rms listing prices at any instant in time. In particular, given that each …rm lists a price with probability ; the actual number of listings is a binomial random variable with mean,
It is straightforward to verify that
This implies that, in markets where N is large, each …rm enjoys a negligible number of loyal consumers and essentially earns zero economic pro…ts. Thus, the environment we study in this section shares two features of competitive markets: (1) each …rm is small relative to the total market, and (2) …rms earn zero equilibrium pro…ts.
As we will see, however, even though …rms earn zero economic pro…ts in the limit, the resulting equilibrium does not entail marginal cost pricing. In fact, prices remain dispersed and exceed marginal cost with probability one when the number of competitors becomes arbitrarily large. The reason stems from the fact that even though each …rm engages in less branding and attracts fewer loyals as N increases, Proposition 3 implies that aggregate branding converges to
This, in turn, implies that the aggregate number of loyals is given by
It is useful to note that, since B L < 1; a positive measure of shoppers remain in the market even as the number of competing …rms engaging in branding grows arbitrarily large.
Furthermore, in the limit the expected number of price listings at the comparison site is
which is positive and …nite since
by Condition 1. In other words, even in online markets where 10; 000 or more …rms could potentially list prices, the actual number of listings at any given point in time can be modest in size.
Finally, note that prices remain dispersed and above marginal cost even as the number of …rms grows arbitrarily large. The limiting distribution of advertised prices is given by
To summarize:
In online markets where an arbitrarily large number of …rms endogenously engage in both brand and informational advertising:
(1) The average number of prices listed at the price comparison site is …nite and is given by n L :
(2) The aggregate demand for brand advertising is …nite and given by A L .
(3) A non-negligible fraction of shoppers, 1 B L > 0, remain in the market.
(4) Prices listed at the comparison site are dispersed according to F L on a non-degenerate
It follows immediately that in online markets where the number of …rms is arbitrarily large there is a unique symmetric dispersed price equilibrium.
Comparative Statics
In light of Propositions 2 and 3 as well as the limit results in the previous section, it is of some interest to examine comparative static properties of the a equilibrium. Our analysis includes an assessment of the impact of endogenous branding on the payo¤s of relevant market participants-…rms, loyals, shoppers, and the "gatekeeper"operating the price comparison site. We also study the e¤ects of endogenous branding on the equilibrium level of price dispersion in online markets. Some of the intuition provided in this section is based on the comparative statics summarized below (Appendix A provides the relevant mathematical details).
? ?
Firm Pro…ts
Do …rms bene…t, in equilibrium, from their costly branding activities? Or do their incentives to promote their brands or services stem from an "oligopolistic lock-in" (see Tauber, 1970) , such that the overall pro…ts of …rms are lower than would arise if the …rms could credibly commit to spend nothing on branding? On the one hand, when the brand expansion parameter ( ) is large, branding might be bene…cial overall in that the mass of shoppers is reduced and hence the incentives to compete on price are blunted. On the other hand, when the main e¤ect of brand advertising is brand stealing (i.e., is large relative to ), then one might imagine the e¤ects going in the opposite direction and …rms bene…ting collectively from a ban on advertising.
To compare the magnitude of these two e¤ects, recall from Proposition 2 that the equilibrium pro…ts of a representative …rm are
After simpli…cation, this expression can be used to obtain industry pro…ts of
In contrast, when …rms can credibly commit not to engage in branding, equilibrium pro…ts are:
Thus,
Proposition 5
In an a equilibrium, the ability to create brand-loyal consumers (at positive cost) decreases industry expected pro…ts by
compared to the case where …rms can credibly commit to not engage in brand advertising.
Proposition 5 shows that the option to engage in brand advertising leaves all …rms strictly worse o¤. Interestingly, the pro…tability of the industry is independent of the marginal bene…t of brand expansion ( ) : Thus, even if the main e¤ect of branding is to "grow"the number of loyal customers rather than stealing existing loyals from other …rms, it is still the case that adding the option of engaging in brand advertising leaves …rms individually and collectively worse o¤. The pro…ts foregone due to this oligopolistic lock-in are greater in high-margin (v m) markets, and in markets with more …rms.
The next proposition summarizes the e¤ects of changes in the parameters of the model on pro…ts in an a equilibrium.
Proposition 6
In an a equilibrium, the equilibrium pro…ts of …rms are independent of the cost of brand advertising ( ) ; increasing in the cost of informational advertising ( ) ;
increasing in the e¤ectiveness of brand stealing ( ) ; independent of the e¤ectiveness of brand expansion ( ) ; and decreasing in the number of competitors (N ) :
Why are equilibrium e-retailer pro…ts independent of the marginal cost of brand advertising, ? After all, an increase in reduces each …rm's equilibrium measure of loyal consumers and a …rm's pro…ts are increasing in its measure of loyal consumers. The answer is that competition to create such consumers entails a long-term commitment of resources, and this fully dissipates the higher pro…ts that would be enjoyed were …rms exogenously endowed with a larger fraction of loyal customers. This invariance result is, in fact, a general property of many contests; see Glazer and Konrad (1999) . In particular, this result obtains so long as …rm i's fraction of loyals may be written as i = G (a i ; A i ) + a i , where G is homogeneous of degree zero in …rms'branding e¤orts.
In contrast, expected pro…ts are increasing in …rms'costs of listing prices on the gatekeeper's comparison site ( ). These costs drive a wedge between the expected pro…ts earned from listing prices in the online market and those from not listing at the gatekeeper's site.
Higher listing fees reduce equilibrium advertising propensities ( ), which lessens price competition and results in higher equilibrium pro…ts.
Brand versus Informational Advertising
The model also sheds light on interrelations between two di¤erent types of advertising strategies. As would be expected, each …rm's demand for brand and price advertising (a and , respectively) is decreasing in price ( and , respectively). The demand for brand advertising is an increasing function of both the direct ( ) and brand-stealing ( ) parameters.
The model predicts that the incentives to create loyal consumers are stronger in markets where it is relatively easy (markets with higher or ) or where it is less costly (markets with lower ) to engage in branding. As a consequence, both the individual and aggregate measure of loyal consumers ( and B , respectively) will be larger in markets where it is easier or less costly to induce consumers to become loyal to a given …rm.
Brand advertising is a substitute for informational advertising; increases in the unit cost of brand advertising ( ) induce …rms to increase their propensities to run price advertisements ( ). The intuition is that higher brand advertising costs result in less brand-building and hence fewer loyal consumers. This reduces the pro…ts …rms earn through tra¢ c at their own websites, and therefore induces them to advertise prices more frequently at the comparison site.
The converse is not true, however; an increase in the cost of informational advertising has no e¤ect on …rms' demand for branding e¤orts: @a =@ = 0. The asymmetric cross price e¤ects stem from the asymmetric manner in which and are paid. Listing fees ( ) are paid only when a …rm lists prices at the gatekeeper's site, while brand advertising costs ( ) are incurred regardless.
These …ndings are summarized in
Proposition 7
In an a equilibrium, demand for brand advertising is decreasing in the marginal cost of brand advertising ( ) ; independent of the cost of informational advertising ( ) ;
and increasing in its e¤ectiveness ( ; ) : Demand for informational advertising is decreasing in the cost of listing a price on the comparison site ( ), increasing in the cost of brand advertising ( ) ; and decreasing in the e¤ectiveness of brand advertising ( ; ) :
Implications for Price Comparison Sites
One of the implications of endogenous branding in oligopolistic online markets is that, While we have taken the fee structure of the price comparison site ( ) as exogenous, the reality is that fee-setting is a strategic variable for the site's owner. How does the presence of endogenous branding alter fee-setting decisions? Can the "gatekeeper"alter its fee structure to bring consumers back to its site?
The answer to the second question turns out to be no. Indeed, an important implication of Proposition 7 is that B (the aggregate fraction of loyal consumers) is independent of the gatekeeper's fees ( ). With this result in hand, one can easily tackle the …rst question: Since the gatekeeper can do nothing through its fee structure to a¤ect the aggregate measure of loyals, optimal advertising fees are identical to the case where branding is exogenous.
Mitigation of the "tra¢ c diverting"e¤ects of branding would seem to require an additional tool on the part of the gatekeeper, such as its own branding e¤orts aimed at creating loyalty to the price comparison site.
Levels of Prices and Dispersion
We close this section with a look at how endogenous branding by …rms in ‡uences the level of prices and the price dispersion observed in online markets. Notice that, when there are n prices listed on the comparison site, the average price paid by shoppers is the expectation of the lowest of n draws from the distribution of advertised prices. In contrast, the average price paid by loyals is simply the average price. Thus, shoppers pay lower average prices than loyal consumers. Our next proposition permits us to examine how branding a¤ects the average prices paid by shoppers and loyals.
Proposition 8
In any symmetric equilibrium, the distribution of advertised prices in markets where …rms create more loyal consumers …rst-order stochastically dominates that in markets where …rms create fewer loyal consumers.
Proposition 8, which is proved in Appendix A, implies that both the average price and, for a given number of price listings, the expected minimum price listed at a price comparison site are increasing in the branding e¤orts of …rms. What implications does this have on expected transaction prices?
To answer this question, …rst recall that the frequency with which a given seller advertises its price at the comparison site ( ) is decreasing in branding; thus, increases in branding lead to a decrease in the expected number of price listings on the site. Next, note that the expected transaction price of loyals is a weighted average of the expected advertised price and the unadvertised price (v), where the weight is simply the probability a seller advertises its price. Since the expected price conditional on listing increases and the probability of listing decreases with increased branding, the average transaction price for loyals is higher with increased branding. The expected transaction price for shoppers is simply the weighted average of the expected minimum price conditional on the number of listings and v when there are no listings on the site. Since, for a given number of listings, the expected minimum price is higher with increased branding and the distribution of the number of listings is lower with increased branding, it follows that the expected transaction price to shoppers also increases with increased branding. To summarize:
Corollary 1 Heightened branding activity raises the expected transaction prices for all consumers.
Next, we turn to the impact of branding on the level of online price dispersion. Recall that an a equilibrium entails a nondegenerate distribution of prices, as …rms stop short of converting all consumers into loyals. One of the more widely used measures of dispersion for online markets is the range, which we operationalize as the support of the price distribution.
This may be written (using Proposition 2) as
This permits us to establish:
In an a equilibrium, equilibrium price dispersion, measured by the range, is greater in online markets where (1) it is less costly to list prices at the gatekeeper's site; or (2) it is more costly or more di¢ cult to create loyal customers. More generally, in any symmetric equilibrium, equilibrium price dispersion, measured by the range, is greater in markets where …rms create fewer loyal consumers.
Part ( 
Empirical Analysis
To gauge the potential usefulness of the model for organizing the pricing patterns observed in online markets, we conclude by highlighting several testable implications of the theory.
Then, we empirically examine these predictions using data from a leading price comparison site.
We begin by considering price dispersion. It is worth noting that even in markets where there are no branding activities (when = 0), the model predicts that prices are nonetheless dispersed: The range of observed prices is predicted to be non-degenerate even for products in which there are no loyal consumers.
Recall that Proposition 9 implies that the range in prices, de…ned as the di¤erence between the upper and lower supports of the equilibrium price distribution, is decreasing in …rms'branding activities. While one cannot directly observe the upper and lower supports of the distribution, one can observe the sample range, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between the highest and lowest prices listed on the comparison site. In Appendix B, we show that for calibrated parameter values of the model, the sample range is also decreasing in …rms'
branding activities (see Figure 1 ). Thus, Prediction 1 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising intensity is higher, price dispersion is lower.
Next, recall that Proposition 8 implies that advertised prices are stochastically ordered.
Hence, the average price listed at the price comparison site, as well as the average minimum price, is an increasing function of …rms'branding intensities. Thus, Prediction 2 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising is higher, average listed prices are also higher.
Prediction 3 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising is higher, the average minimum listed price is also higher.
The economic motivation for focusing on these two predictions stems from the fact that the average listed price and the average minimum price are related to the prices paid by loyal consumers and shoppers. Other things equal, higher average listed prices imply higher transactions prices for loyal consumers, and higher average minimum prices imply higher prices paid by shoppers who purchase products online. Note that the di¤erence in these two average prices re ‡ects the average savings of a consumer who purchases at the "best" listed price rather than the average listed price. Thus, Ep Ep min provides one measure of the value of the price information provided by a price comparison site. The calibrations in Appendix B also imply that this measure of the value of information is decreasing in …rms' branding activities (see Figure 1) . Thus, Prediction 4 All else equal, in markets where brand advertising intensity is higher, the value of price information is lower.
Data
To examine these predictions, we assembled a dataset for 90 of the best-selling products During the period of our study, …rms uploaded their prices into Shopper.com's database, which then fetched the uploaded data at speci…ed times twice each day. Thus, daily pricing decisions re ‡ect simultaneous moves. Moreover, there is a minimum twelve hour lag for any …rm to "answer" a pricing move by its rival owing to the upload/refresh cycle. To advertise a product price, a merchant was required to pay a …xed fee of $1,000 to set up an account at Shopper.com, plus an additional fee of $100 per month. This fee structure provides merchants incentives to post accurate prices; a …rm advertising a bogus price in an attempt to lure customers to its own website would generate many quali…ed leads, but would likely alienate potential customers and incur additional costs. 13 We also veri…ed the accuracy of prices via an audit; more than 96 percent of the prices audited at Shopper.com were accurate within $1.
In addition to Predictions 1-4, the equilibrium characterization o¤ered in Proposition Table 1 provides basic summary statistics for these data averaged over all products and dates; henceforth, product-dates. 14 On average, 29 …rms listed prices for each product and, on average, 8.29 percent of these …rms advertised using a logo along with their price listing.
While the average price of a product was $458.86, there is considerable variation in the prices di¤erent …rms charge for a given product. The average lowest price is $387.58, while the average highest price charged is $555.11. The average level of price dispersion is substantial, with an average range of $167.53. As shown in Figure 2 , the average range is fairly stable and quite sizeable during the period of our study. 13 The $100 monthly fee entitled sellers to up to 200 free clickthroughs from consumers per month. Sellers who exceed this threshold incur a cost on the order of 50 cents per clickthrough.
14 The number of product-dates listed in Table 1 is less than what simple math would suggest (90 products 205 days = 18,400 product dates) due to product life-cycle e¤ects. That is, products naturally drop out of the sample over time due to the introduction of new models or product upgrades.
Estimation Strategy and Results
The theory presented above suggests that, for each product i and date t; the range (R it ) and average prices (Ep it and Ep min;it ) are nonlinear functions of product characteristics (such as the marginal cost of the product, m it ), consumer demand characteristics (such as v it ), the level of branding (or alternatively, it ) ; and the number of …rms in the market for product i in period t (N it ). For example, using the distribution of advertised prices in an a equilibrium and integrating by parts yields the following structural expression for the expected advertised price of product i in period t as a function of the relevant explanatory variables:
5 dp
In light of the gross nonlinearities involved-and the fact that we only have proxies for some potentially important explanatory variables-our estimation strategy is to attempt to isolate the impact of branding on the variables of interest (Predictions 1-4) by controlling for other variables that theory suggests might in ‡uence the observed levels of price dispersion, average prices, and value of information. In what follows, we estimate a logarithmic …rst-order Taylor's series approximation of the nonlinear functional forms for the expected price, minimum price, and range of prices for product i at time t. Speci…cally, in light of the cross-sectional time series nature of our data, we use product dummies to control for the fact that consumers are likely to have very di¤erent reservation prices (v it ) for di¤er-ent products and …rms most likely incur di¤erent marginal costs (m it ) in selling di¤erent products. To further control for potential heterogeneities in demand across products, we also include dummy variables for product popularity. Among other things, this controls for possibility that consumers have higher reservation prices for popular products, as well as the possibility that …rms are more eager to sell such products. In order to control for the possibility that the general costs of e-retailing, the number of consumers with Internet access, or overall consumer demand for consumer electronics products (and hence reservation prices) temporally varied during the period of our study, we also include date dummies to control for potential systematic temporal di¤erences in reservation prices and/or …rms'cost. One of the advantages of the size of our dataset is that it permits us to include 205 date dummies for each day in our sample, 100 dummy variables to control for product popularity (the most popular product, the second most popular product, and so on), as well as 90 product dummies for each product in our sample.
The measure of branding used in our analysis is logo branding, and is based on the classical marketing de…nition in Keller (2002) . 15 Speci…cally, for each product-date, we compute the percentage of …rms that paid Shopper.com to display a logo along with their price. Even though branding decisions by individual …rms did not tend to change during the period of our study (consistent with the assumed two-stage structure of our model), there is substantial variation in the use of logos across products and over time (time variation occurs because, as predicted by the model, individual …rms' listing decisions vary over time and thus the observed fraction of …rms displaying logos on any particular product-date varies).
The model predicts that dispersion should be lower and average prices higher for products in which logos are more prevalent. To control for unobserved variation in branding across di¤erent products, as well as other factors that might also in ‡uence levels of dispersion and prices, all speci…cations include product dummies to absorb all other sources of variation across products. 16 We note that, while the number of potential …rms is unobservable, it is statistically related to the observed number of listings on a given date. For this reason, we use the number of listings for product i on date t as a proxy for N it : It is important to stress, however, that while the theoretical model presented above is an oligopoly model in which the number of sellers is taken to be exogenous, we are sympathetic to the possibility that …rms'decisions to enter the online market for a particular product might be endogenous. Unfortunately, we do not have available instruments to correct for this potential endogeneity. However, the potential problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that we include product rank dummies (which control to some extent for the possibility that more popular products attract more …rms) and by the fact that every …rm at Shopper.com must make its period t pricing decisions before it knows how many other …rms have decided to compete on that date. Since a necessary condition for listing the price of a given product on a given date is that the …rm paid the $100 monthly "entry fee"which merely gives it the opportunity to list and update its price daily for 30 days, to the extent that the number of potential sellers of product i on date t is endogenous, some might argue that such entry decisions are determined well before period t pricing decisions.
With these caveats, we turn to the data analysis. In Tables 2-5 we report semi-log regression results that summarize the estimated impact of branding on, respectively, the sample range, average price, average minimum price, and the value of information. 17 For the reasons discussed above, all speci…cations include product dummies to control for unobserved components of branding and other factors that might give rise to systematic di¤erences in the levels of prices across di¤erent products. We also include a variety of other controls to account for the impact of market structure, product life cycles, and other factors. Standard errors have been corrected for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the procedure described in Newey and West (1987) . In each table, Model 1 represents a baseline regression in which the dependent variable associated with product i at time t is regressed on branding activity, the number of …rms listing prices on that date, and product dummies. Models 2 through 4 add controls for nonlinear number of …rm e¤ects, product popularity dummies, and date dummies, respectively. Popularity dummies are based on Shopper.com's Product Rank (which ranges from 1 to 100 for the products in our sample). 17 The results are robust to regressions based on levels rather than logs.
are consistent with Prediction 1. Notice that this issue does not arise in Model 4 of Table 2 . In particular, this speci…cation is based on the di¤erence in the highest and lowest prices at each product date. To the extent that the life cycle e¤ects for a given product are similar for both the highest and lowest prices, di¤erencing the data eliminates individual product life cycle e¤ects. Thus, the speci…cation in Model 4 of Table 2 allows for di¤erences in life cycle e¤ects across products, while that in Model 4 of Tables 3 and 4 do not. Table 4 lead to results that are consistent with Prediction 4: …rms'branding e¤orts appear to adversely a¤ect the value of the gatekeeper's site.
The empirical evidence suggests that the level of dispersion and the value of price information in online markets is in ‡uenced by the branding activities of …rms. Our empirical analysis, however, is limited by the absence of alternative theoretical models as well as data limitations that preclude structural estimation. Indeed, while the empirical evidence is broadly consistent with our theoretical model, it is important to stress that alternative models may better organize the data. Likewise, alternative datasets might permit one to probe other aspects of the theory and deal with some of the potential problems (such as endogeneity) discussed above. The empirical results presented here suggest that future theoretical and empirical research along these lines might prove to be useful additions to the literature.
A Mathematical Appendix
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 rely on a series of lemmas detailed below.
Lemma 1 Suppose each …rm has 2 0;
1 N loyal customers and that 2 0;
Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in second stage game where:
Each …rm lists its price on the price comparison site with probability
Proof. By the usual price undercutting arguments, one can show that in any symmetric equilibrium, the distribution of advertised prices (a) is atomless and contains no gaps, and (b) has an upper support of v:
Let and F be candidates for the (symmetric) equilibrium propensity and distribution of advertised prices, respectively. Then a seller that does not list (L i = 0) its price on the comparison site earns expected pro…ts of
which is clearly maximized at a price of v: Thus, conditional on not listing, the optimal price is v; and the corresponding pro…ts are
In contrast, a seller that does list (L i = 1) a price of p 2 Support(F ) on the comparison site earns expected pro…ts of
Using the binomial theorem, this expression simpli…es to:
for all p 2 Support(F ) :
Derivation of . By assumption, 2 0;
We …rst show that 2 (0; 1) in any symmetric equilibrium. By way of contradiction, suppose not. If = 0; no other …rms list prices on the comparison site and a …rm that deviates by listing a price of v on the comparison site earns (using equation (12))
which contradicts the hypothesis that = 0 is part of a symmetric equilibrium. On the other hand, if = 1, a …rm that prices at (or slightly below) v earns expected pro…ts of
Thus, if = 1, …rm i's expected pro…ts from not listing exceed those from listing, which contradicts the hypothesis that = 1 is part of a symmetric equilibrium. We conclude that 2 (0; 1) :
Next, we establish . Since 2 (0; 1), equilibrium requires the equalization of equations (11) and (12) for almost all p in the support of F: Noting that
yields the following necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium:
Hence,
in any symmetric equilibrium. Note that 2 0;
Derivation of F . In a symmetric equilibrium, each …rm must be indi¤erent between (a) charging a price of v and not listing at the price comparison site, and (b) listing any price in the support of F :
Solving for 1
It is a routine matter to verify that F is a well-de…ned atomless cdf on Finally, notice that it is not pro…table for a …rm to price below p 0 ; since F is atomless, a …rm enjoys the same sales at a price of p 0 as it does at any p < p 0 , and the markup is higher at p 0 than p < p 0 :
Thus, ( ; F ) represent the unique symmetric pricing strategies at a price comparison site when each seller enjoys loyal consumers. When each …rm has loyal customers (as is the case when each …rm chooses brand advertising level a in the …rst stage), equilibrium pro…ts following the second stage game are:
Thus, a constitutes a symmetric equilibrium level of brand advertising if and only if
Substituting for z (a) and solving reveals that this inequality is satis…ed if and only if a 2
Proof of Proposition 3
The second part follows from the fact that
Comparative Statics. We next verify the comparative statics provided in the text. Note
Hence, @E =@ > 0; @E =@ = @E =@ = 0; @E =@N < 0; @E =@ > 0; @E =@v > 0; and @E =@m < 0. Furthermore, since
it is immediate that @a =@ > 0; @a =@ > 0; @a =@ < 0; @a =@ = 0; @a =@v > 0; and @a =@m < 0. In addition,
Next, note that
Hence, it is immediate that @ =@ > 0 and @ =@ = 0. In addition,
Finally is decreasing in B , it follows (using the comparative statics for B ) that @ =@ < 0; @ =@ < 0; @ =@ > 0; and @ =@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
To establish this result, rewrite the equilibrium distribution of advertised prices as: We are now in a position to prove Proposition 8. Since is decreasing in ; it is su¢ cient to show that F is decreasing in : Notice that for all p 2 [p 0 ; v] :
= 0;
where the inequality follows from the facts derived above. Since 
B Calibration
In general, the sample range and the value of information are of ambiguous sign with respect to changes in branding. As discussed in the text, we calibrated an a equilibrium of the model to infer the implied relationship between branding and price dispersion around the mean values of our data. Speci…cally, we approximated consumers'maximal willingness to pay by the average maximum price observed in our data; v = $555:11: We approximated the number of price-sensitive consumers on the price comparison site based on estimates by
Brynjolfsson, Montgomery, and Smith (2003) for the 2000-2002 period; 1 B = :13. We set the number of potential …rms at N = 68; which is the largest number of …rms listing prices for any product in our dataset. 18 The listing fee for posting a price at the comparison site is calibrated at = $3:33, which is the average cost per day of listing a price at Shopper.com during the period of our study.
Calibrating marginal cost is more involved. We assumed a 38.5% gross margin on the average transaction price, which is based on the US Census Bureau's estimate of the average 18 Note that the average minimum price, one also needs an esitmate of the particular realization of the nu margin for Electronic Shopping and Mail Order Retailers (NAICS 4541). 19 To obtain the average transaction price, we supposed that 13% of customers bought items at the average minimum price-that is, were shoppers in our terminology-while the reminder bought items at the average price-that is were loyal customers; thus, Expressed di¤erently, the empirical results in Tables 2 and 5 , along with the calibration in 
